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Objectives: This paper presents an overview and comparative analysis of the epidemiological situation 
and the policy responses in France, Belgium, and Canada during the early stages of the 2020 Covid-19 
pandemic (Feb.-Aug. 2020). These three countries are compared because they represent a spectrum of 
different governance structures while also being OECD nations that are similar in many other respects. 
Methods: A rapid review of primary data from the three countries was conducted. Data was collected 
from official government documents whenever possible, supplemented by information from international 
databases and local media reports. The data was then analysed to identify common patterns as well as 
significant divergences across the three countries, especially in the areas of health policy and technology 
use. 
Results: France, Belgium and Canada faced differing epidemiological situations during the Covid-19 pan- 
demic, and the wide variety of policy actions taken appears to be linked to existing governance and 
healthcare structures. The varying degrees of federalism and regional autonomy across the three countries 
highlight the different constraints faced by national policy-makers within different governance models. 
Conclusions: The actions taken by all three countries appear to have been largely dictated by existing 
health system capacity, with increasing federalism associated with more fragmented strategies and less 
coordination across jurisdictions. However, the implications of certain policies related to economic re- 
silience and health system capacity cannot yet be fully evaluated and may even prove to have net nega- 
tive impacts into the future. 
© 2020 Fellowship of Postgraduate Medicine. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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p  Introduction 
As Covid-19 continues to impact societies in multiple ways,
understanding how different governance regimes addressed the
challenges of this pandemic may yield lessons for policymakers
who continue to manage the economic, physical, mental and be-
havioural health consequences of this disease using a constantly
evolving evidence base. While several reports, policy trackers,
preprints and working papers exist on Covid-19 beyond what could
be summarized in one single article, the non-biomedical peer-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: peter.mcmeekin@northumbria.ac.uk , 
peter.mcmeekin@northumbria.ac.uk (P. McMeekin). 
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( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) eviewed literature is much more limited, with policy papers ex-
loring questions of political polarization [1] , public involvement
r the effects of social distancing [2] . A comparison of differences
n governance regimes and population concentrations could be
ritical to improve our understanding of how and why different
olicies or technologies have been used to tackle Covid-19, and
tart to reflect on their economic implications. To our knowledge,
o such academic paper exists. 
In an effort to fill this gap in the literature, we propose a com-
arative analysis of France, Belgium and Canada. These three coun-
ries offer a spectrum across modes of governance and population
ensity, while also being sufficiently similar to allow for useful
omparisons to be drawn between them. To this end, we first pro-
ide a comprehensive picture of the pandemic in these three coun-an open access article under the CC BY license 
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Table 1 
Demographic Data Relevant to the impact of Covid-19 in France, Belgium, and Canada. 
France Belgium Canada 
Government Type [7] Semi-presidential republic Federal parliamentary democracy 
under a constitutional monarchy 
Federal parliamentary democracy 
under a constitutional monarchy 
Regional Organization 13 regions, 5 overseas department 
and regions, and 7 overseas 
territories 
3 regions (Flemish Region, 
Brussels Capital Region and 
Walloon Region) & 3 linguistic 
communities (Flemish, French and 
German) 
10 Provinces (sovereign in 
Constitutionally agreed areas) and 
3 Territories (directly dependant 
from the Federal level) 
Population (million) 67.0 [8] 11.4 [9] 37 (Canada): 14.5 (Ontario): 8.5 
(Quebec): 5 (British Columbia) 
[10] 
Population density per km ² 104.9 [8] 991 [9] 4 [10] 
% Pop. above 65 19.3 [9] 19.1 [10] 17 [10] 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 82.65 (total): 85.6 (female): 79.7 
(male) [8] 
81.5 (total): 83.7 (female): 79.2 
(male) [11] 
81.95 (total): 84 (female): 79.9 
(male) [10] 
GDP/Capita ( €) 31 200 [9] 35 900 [12] 28 055 [10] 
Unemployment rate prior to Covid-19 (%) [13] 8.2 5.2 6.3 
Prevalence of Chronic Conditions (% of total 
deaths): [14] 
Diabetes 
Cardiovascular Diseases 
Respiratory Diseases 
2 
28 
4 
2 
30 
7 
3 
27 
7 
Obesity Prevalence (% of population 
considered obese, 2016) [7] 
21.6 22.1 29.4 
Alcohol Consumption (liters of pure alcohol 
per capita 2016) [10] 
12.6 12.1 8.9 
Tobacco Use (% of adult population smoking) 25 [9] 15 [9] 15.8 [15] 
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ries, followed by an analysis of the different policy actions taken
y each country in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Within this
nalysis, particular focus is given to the ways in which technology
as harnessed to assist with the implementation of various policy
bjectives, with technology being defined as any new process, sys-
em or device, digital or otherwise, that is employed to improve
ealth or social outcomes. We then further explore each country’s
esponses using a detailed overview of their individual healthcare
ystem responses and economic policies and how they differ ac-
ording to existing governance structures. 
verview of France, Belgium & Canada 
As founding members of “la Francophonie”, the international
rganization for the French language, France, Belgium and Canada
hare obvious linguistic ties that have fostered historically close
conomic and diplomatic relationships. The primarily French-
peaking province of Québec in Canada and the region of Wal-
onia in Belgium are especially interlinked with metropolitan
rance. Although Canada and Belgium both have wider English and
lemish-speaking communities outside of these areas, their com-
on threads with France, including deep trade relationships, pro-
ide a backdrop for examining the nature of the Covid-19 outbreak
n each of the three countries [3 , 4] . 
Apart from these similarities the three countries also have sub-
tantial differences, especially in terms of governance and demog-
aphy, that create an interesting backdrop for comparative policy
nalysis ( Table 1 ). France has the largest population by a significant
argin, with highly centralized government institutions and only
imited delegation to the regions, including within the healthcare
ector [5] . Belgium is by far the smallest of the three both in terms
f population and land mass, and operates under a federal gover-
ance structure that gives substantial responsibilities to the var-
ous regional governments, although healthcare provision mainly
emains under the purview of the central government [6] . Canada,
ith a much larger land mass, has more defined divisions of power
etween federal and provincial governments, with the provinces
dministering the vast majority of public services including health-are [6] . This gradient of governance, from almost fully centralized
ontrol in France to broad regional sovereignty in Canada, with
elgium in the centre, provides an excellent lens for comparison
f each country’s policy responses during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Adding nuance to the governance perspective, France, Belgium
nd Canada do share demographic similarities that might have pre-
icted comparable health impacts from COVID-19, such as the pro-
ortion of the population over 65 years of age, overall life ex-
ectancy, or the rates of many chronic diseases. However, differ-
nces in respiratory disease rates and obesity prevalence are also
ikely to have contributed to variations in overall case mortality, as
hey have been found to be meaningful predictors of severity in
ovid-19 patients [16] . 
Beyond demographic information, the three countries also ex-
ibit significant differences in healthcare workforce, infrastructure,
nd functionality in their respective healthcare systems ( Table 2 ).
he unique nature of each country’s healthcare landscape, heavily
onditioned by the respective governance and population charac-
eristics, is a significant constraint that shapes the available policy
ctions and priorities of their respective governments, and this be-
ame very clear over the course of the Covid-19 pandemic. France,
elgium and Canada all offer universal health insurance to their
itizens, but there is significant variation in the services covered,
nd Canada’s system in particular stands apart from those in Bel-
ium and France because of the impact of the early 20 0 0s SARS
andemic and the subsequent reorganization of some of its struc-
ures [17] . 
ovid-19 trends 
This section presents a selection of data related to the Covid-
9 pandemic in France, Belgium, and Canada from the beginning
f the pandemic until early August. Due to the constantly evolving
ature of the pandemic, authorities in France, Belgium and Canada
dapted and changed their data reporting standards over time, and
his inconsistent approach to information management is impor-
ant to examine before considering the official Covid-19 figures
hemselves. 
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Table 2 
Healthcare System Overviews for France, Belgium and Canada Prior to Covid-19 Outbreak. 
France [5] Belgium [9] Canada [5] 
Healthcare Financing Scheme Mandatory social health insurance 
system funded through both 
general and earmarked taxation. 
Bismarck-style mandatory health 
insurance provided through six 
private not-for-profit insurers and 
one public sickness fund. [6] 
Beveridge-style universal health 
insurance, funded through general 
taxation. 
Healthcare Spending per Capita ( €) 3 626 (11.3% of GDP) [9] 3 554 (10.3% of GDP) 4 361 (10.57% of GDP) [10] 
Healthcare Governance Structure [5 , 6 , 9] Healthcare provision is a national 
responsibility. The central 
government provides regulation 
and engages in negotiation with 
providers and insurers, with a 
small delegated role for regional 
health authorities. 
Regulation of compulsory health 
insurance and hospitals falls 
under the responsibility of the 
federal authorities. Federal entities 
are responsible for financing 
hospital investment. 
Provinces and territories have 
primary responsibility for 
organizing, funding and delivering 
healthcare services, with a small 
regulatory and financial role for 
the central government. 
Public/Private Division in Acute (Hospital) 
Care System 
Two-thirds of hospital beds are in 
government or non-profit 
facilities, with the remaining third 
privately owned. Hospital 
physicians are salaried, and the 
hospital reimbursement system is 
based on diagnosis related groups 
(DRGs). 
The vast majority of hospitals are 
publicly funded. They are 
independent units or part of a 
larger organization that get 
funding from the public health 
service 
Hospitals are mostly public or 
non-profit facilities, depending on 
the province. Global budgets 
remain dominant, with a few 
provinces using case-based 
payment. 
Primary and Community Care System Most GPs (68%) and specialists 
(51%) work as self-employed sole 
practitioners. The majority of the 
population has a GP as a 
gatekeeper, but a small proportion 
select a specialist to take on this 
role. 
Individuals are free to consult any 
GP or specialist that they choose. 
Primary care doctors are mainly 
self-employed in private practice 
and paid fee-for-service. 
GPs are mainly self-employed in 
private practices, and act as 
gatekeepers to specialized care. 
Pharmacy and Prescription Medication System Private, dispensing-based 
contracts plus other services, 
traditionally done in general 
practice including dispensing 
certain drugs without prescription 
if link maintained to usual doctor 
Pharmaceuticals dispensed out of 
hospitals represents a large share 
of out of pocket spending. 
Pharmacists receive a margin of 
31 percent on the sale of drugs, 
up to a ceiling. 
Medications are generally not 
covered under the universal 
insurance, and most individuals 
have to pay out of pocket unless 
they have supplementary private 
insurance through an employer 
Long-term Care SHI covers medical costs for 
long-term care, but not housing 
costs. Private sector share of 
facilities is at 18% and has been 
rising steadily 
There is substantial public funding 
for long-term care, which is 
assigned based on dependency 
level [18] 
Systems vary widely between 
provinces and regions, but 
generally long-term care facilities 
are mostly private and are not 
considered insured services 
Mental Health Care Care from GPs and psychiatrists in 
private practice is covered by SHI, 
with all other types of treatments 
paid out of pocket or through 
supplementary insurance 
The national government funds 
care within hospitals, while the 
federal entities are responsible for 
outpatient care, resulting in a 
variety of coverages across the 
country 
Only mental health care provided 
by a physician is covered under 
universal insurance scheme, with 
psychologist/counselling services 
paid for out-of-pocket or through 
private insurance 
Public Health System The national public health 
institution (Santé Publique) sets 
national health strategy and 
directs regional health agencies to 
implement their chosen measures. 
Public health and prevention 
programs are a collaborative effort 
by federal entities, with the 
Federal Public Service for Health, 
Food Chain Safety and 
Environment at the centre 
Health Canada and the Public 
Health Agency of Canada provide 
guidance at the national level, but 
provinces and local health units 
are responsible for implementing 
public health measures 
Number of physicians (GP/Specialist) per 1000 
inhabitants 
1.52 GP: 1.85 Specialist [19] 1.9 GP: 1.79 [20] 1.15 GP: 1.13 Specialist [5] 
Number of nurses per 1000 inhabitants 10.8 [13] 9.4 [20] 11.67 [21] 
Hospital beds per 100.000 inhabitants 647.72 [22] 622.87 [22] 270 [10] 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds per 100.000 
inhabitants 
10.75 (70% equipped with 
ventilators) [23] 
13.16 [24] 8.56 (13.46 ventilators) [25] 
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Overview of data availability and data transparency 
In France, Santé Publique France (SPF), the centralized na-
tional agency for public health, published an official dashboard
with detailed epidemiological statistics in early March, and de-
tailed epidemiological data about region, age, gender and case
severity was routinely published by the French government start-
ing on March 18th [26] . By the end of May, SPF was publish-
ing highly detailed weekly reports for each region and providing
national-level daily updates on key statistics such as case num-
bers, hospitalizations, and deaths. Notably, France began to dis-
tinguish between deaths in long term care homes and deaths
in hospitals on April 2nd, a step many other countries had not
taken [26] . To improve transparency, France relied on its institutional
echanisms and laws related to the “open data policy”, which al-
owed government actors to quickly move towards publishing pub-
ic data and administrative documents without legal hurdles [27] .
he open data policy also allowed for hospital data to be made ac-
essible during the Covid-19 crisis starting from the 27th of March,
lthough this was done within the context of the “state of health
mergency” that was declared on March 22nd [27] . Despite the ad-
antages afforded by this policy, France still faced time lags of 7–11
ays before confirming data received from regional authorities, and
ven greater delays have occurred, including one caused by a cyber
ttack on Marseille’s city hall which led to a vast underestimation
f Covid-19 deaths in the Bouches-de-Rhône region over the last
wo weeks of March [26] . 
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Fig. 1. Heat map showing the regional distribution of Covid-19 hospitalizations in France (As of 09/08) (France did not report number of cases by region) [26] . 
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t  Sciensano, the Belgian Institute for Health, played a similarly
entral role to SPF in terms of data collection. Sciensano also set up
n online dashboard that reported progressively more detailed case
nformation, and the Belgian government took an even broader ap-
roach to reporting Covid-19 cases and deaths. Starting on March
1st, Belgium began to report confirmed and suspected Covid-19
eaths that occurred both in and out of hospital as part of its of-
cial death statistics [27] . This reporting standard may have con-
ributed to Belgium having the highest case-fatality ratio (16.3%)
nd mortality rate per 100 000 (80.65) people in the world as of
he beginning of June [28] . Despite concerns from the domestic
ourism industry about these data reporting choices on the coun-
ry’s global brand, the government remained committed to the
omprehensive counting methods, and even included suspected
ases in long term care homes in the official case count, although
he detailed epidemiological data continued to suffer from consid-
rable reporting lag [27 , 29] . 
In sharp contrast to Belgium and France, information man-
gement effort s in Canada were severely hampered by the rela-
ive weakness of the federal government’s public health appara-
us compared to their provincial counterparts. The federal govern-
ent did publish the requisite online dashboard with basic statis-
ics such as case numbers and deaths, but national-level epidemi-
logical data remained heavily affected by time lag with almost no
mprovement until late June. On May 25th, for example, Canada
ad 85 679 confirmed cases of Covid-19, but the federal govern-
ent had complete data on only 40 660 [30] . Much of the na-
ional ineffectiveness in data reporting can be tied to the autonomyf the provinces; the federal government was reliant on provincial
ealth authorities to report data and federal agencies historically
ave limited public health competency [5] . 
At the provincial level, government data was much more re-
iable, although there were large differences between provinces.
hile some provinces with relatively high case numbers made
onsistent effort s to improve data availability, the hardest hit
rovince of Québec only began to publish official data in May after
eceiving pressure from academics who orchestrated a campaign
or more information to help guide public policy [31] . This delay
as exacerbated by the standing policy of l’Institut de la Statis-
ique du Québec (ISQ) which prevented official verification of mor-
ality data until 24 months after a death, greatly challenging the
rovince’s ability to operate based on up-to-date figures [31] . 
he spread of the pandemic in France, Belgium and Canada 
In France ( Fig. 1 ), Covid-19 cases were confirmed as early as
ecember 27th [32] , but the source of the primary outbreak was
raced back to a large religious gathering in Mulhouse in the region
f Grand-Est between the 17–24th of February, which brought peo-
le in from all over the country who then returned to spread the
irus to their respective regions [33] . From that point on, Grand-
st and neighbouring Île de France (Paris and surrounding areas)
ecame the epicentres of the pandemic in France. 
In Canada ( Fig. 2 ), the major outbreaks in the largest provinces
lso began in early March and were predominantly traced back to
he United States [34] . The vast majority of the initial spread in
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Fig. 2. Heat map showing the regional distribution of Covid-19 cases in Canada (as of 09/08) [31] . 
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b  each province has been traced to travellers from the U.S., although
in Québec a significant amount also arrived from France [34] . De-
spite a substantial amount of government rhetoric being directed
towards the danger of travellers from China, these same travellers
accounted for zero cases in Québec, one in Alberta, and only five
in Ontario [34] . 
Belgium ( Fig. 3 ) also saw a sharp rise in cases throughout the
month of March, but unlike in Canada and France the origins
of their widespread outbreaks are less clear. Despite the French-
speaking region of Wallonia having a shared border and close
economic ties with the Grand-Est region of France, the spread
and severity of infection across Belgium affected several Dutch-
speaking provinces in Flanders most acutely. This can partially be
explained by more widespread testing in Flanders, but it also in-
dicates that community-based transmission likely played a greater
role than transmission by regional travellers [27] . 
Covid-19 data from France, Belgium and Canada 
In France and Belgium, and indeed across most of Europe, the
number of new Covid-19 cases spiked dramatically between the
middle of March and the middle of April before progressively sub-
siding into early June ( Fig. 4 ). In Canada, the peak of the pan-
demic occurred somewhat later, largely driven by a major out-
break in Québec and a smaller but still significant outbreak in
Ontario, which together accounted for over 95% of the country’s
total deaths from Covid-19. In contrast, the next largest province
of British Columbia (B.C.) was able to efficiently hinder transmis-
sion [30] . Due to Canada having a drastically larger sovereign area
and greater policy differences between provinces, these three most
populous Canadian provinces are included in the analysis in ad-ition to national data when possible in order to provide a more
omplete account of the experience of the country as a whole. 
Despite differences between provinces, the number of new
ases across Canada had been largely stabilized at a low rate by
id-June, following the same trend as France and Belgium. How-
ver, after the countries began to gradually ease pandemic restric-
ions and re-open their economies, all three experienced a resur-
ence in new cases. While in Canada this growth did not reach the
apid pace of new infections seen during the initial outbreak, the
ituation was more concerning in France, which was seeing a sig-
ificant growth in daily new cases by early August. The situation in
elgium was even worse and there was a much larger spike in new
ases beginning in the middle of July that continued to grow at a
ace well above that of the other two countries, leading to con-
erns that new measures would need to be implemented to pre-
ent a large second wave of the pandemic [27] . 
This resurgence in cases in France and Belgium was not accom-
anied by the same levels of concern seen during March and April,
owever, as the resulting impact on healthcare systems appeared
o be less dramatic, possibly due to earlier increases to ICU capac-
ty ( Fig. 5 ). These capacity increases were implemented out of ne-
essity when cases peaked in the two countries and their respec-
ive healthcare systems began to show signs of strain. In France,
he four most affected regions (Île-de-France, Grand-Est, Auvergne-
hône-Alpes, Hauts-de-France) accounted for 74% of all Covid-19
CU patients nationwide. Many of the hospitals in these regions
ere overwhelmed, in some instances forcing healthcare workers
o make rationing decisions regarding the distribution of necessary
are [38] . In some instances, the government was required to mo-
ilize the military to evacuate some of these patients to less af-
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Fig. 3. Heat map showing the regional distribution of Covid-19 cases in Belgium (As of 09/08) [27] . 
Fig. 4. Comparison of the trends of new daily Covid-19 cases (per 100 000 population) across France, Belgium, Ontario, Québec, B.C. and Canada (7 day rolling Average) 
[26,27,35–37] . 
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r  ected regions within the country or even to send some by air to
ermany and Switzerland [39] . 
ICU capacity was not as strained in Canada, but management
f the pandemic response was far less centralized which inhib-
ted the same type of inter-regional cooperation seen in the Frenchealth care system [30] . Ontario’s ICU capacity was not seriously
hallenged throughout the pandemic, while neighbouring Québec
rappled with a peak of 20% capacity use that only began to sub-
ide in mid-July, with some hospitals in the Montréal region expe-
iencing even more acute spikes in demand [35 , 36] . As of early Au-
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Fig. 5. Trends in total ICU capacity used by Covid-19 patients in France, Belgium, Ontario, Québec and British Columbia (B.C.) (including increases to capacity over time; 
national-level data for Canada is not available) [26 , 27 , 35 , 36 , 37] . 
Fig. 6. Trends in case fatality rate for all Covid-19 cases in France, Belgium, Ontario, Québec, B.C. and Canada [26,27,35–37] . 
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c  gust, however, the use of ICU capacity for Covid-19 patients across
Canada, including in Québec, had dropped to their lowest levels
since May and appeared to be stabilized. 
As ICU usage began to increase, the case fatality rate trends in
France and Belgium began to rise as well ( Fig. 6 ). However, a com-
parison of this same trend across Ontario and Québec appears to
highlight conflicting information, as they have highly similar rates
despite more than twice as much strain being placed on Québec’s
intensive care system. An analysis of population mortality rates
from Covid-19 demonstrates that case fatality rates can be mis-
leading, as these figures are influenced by a variety of different
factors ( Fig. 7 ). Testing strategies, data reporting and affected de-
mographics within Belgium and Québec pushed their case fatality
rates lower than that of France, despite their higher actual popula-
tion mortality rates. 
In addition to differences in testing, epidemiological and socio-
economic elements also influenced the impact of the pandemiccross the three countries. As was the case in most of the world,
he most severe impacts of Covid-19 in France, Belgium and
anada were distributed disproportionately amongst older pop-
lations, with over 90% of total deaths due to the virus occur-
ing in people over 65 years of age even though these same
opulations accounted for less than half of total cases [26 , 27 , 30] .
ge was also not the only serious risk factor for mortality
cross the three countries as over 70% of hospitalized cases had
ne or more pre-existing comorbidities, most commonly hyper-
ension and other cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and obesity
27 , 30 , 40] . 
The three countries also largely followed global trends in terms
f the disproportionate fatality rate of the virus amongst men
 Fig. 8 ), although the experience in Canada was more nuanced be-
ause of the significantly larger female populations within Canada’s
ard-hit long-term care homes, where over 82% of fatalities oc-
urred [41] . While men were more likely to die from Covid-19,
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Fig. 7. Cumulative mortality trends per 100 000 population in France, Belgium, Ontario, Québec, B.C. and Canada [26 , 27 , 30 , 35 , 36 , 37] . 
Fig. 8. Proportion of Covid-19 cases and deaths affecting males in France, Belgium and Canada [26 , 27 , 30] . 
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t  omen in all three countries were more likely to contract it, driven
n part by unequal gender distribution in the health workforce.
igures from France and Canada show that workers in female-
ominated professions such as nursing and personal support care
ere three times more likely to test positive for the virus com-
ared to doctors [21 , 40] . 
Socioeconomic factors likely also played a large role in shap-
ng the specific impacts of the pandemic, but the vast majority of
ealthcare providers in Canada and Belgium do not routinely col-
ect data on sociodemographic variables beyond age and gender,
nd doing so in France is completely prohibited [21 , 42] . There is
owever ample suggestive evidence that poverty and ethnic mi-
ority status are correlated with worse health outcomes related
o Covid-19. The poorest department in mainland France, Seine
t. Denis, reported higher mortality than any other French de-
artment, while fatality rates in cities like Brussels and Montréal
ere also substantially higher in more impoverished neighbour-
oods [26 , 27 , 36] . olicy and technology road map 
The scope of policy actions taken in France, Belgium and
anada in response to the Covid-19 pandemic is incredibly broad,
ith each country employing widely varying individual policies
nd recommendations across all sectors of society. This section
resents the most salient of these actions for comparison across
he three countries. To simplify the interpretation of the figures
n this section, a policy categorization scheme is employed using
hree levels of severity: Minimal (recommendations by the govern-
ent, not mandated by law [blue text]); Medium (mandated by
aw, no enforced punishment measures [orange text]); and Signifi-
ant (mandated by law with enforced punishment [red text]) [43] . 
In France, the government was relatively complacent as the
rst cases were counted and only implemented severe measures
nce infections began to rapidly rise ( Fig. 9 ). Initially, most ac-
ions taken came in the form of recommendations for safe prac-
ices to slow the spread of the virus, but in many cases these were
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Fig. 9. Timeline of economic and virus containment policies in France contrasted with trends in daily new Covid-19 cases per 100 000 (Minimal, Medium, Severe, Uncate- 
gorized) [26] . 
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t  largely ignored. This led to a hardening of government action be-
tween March 10th and March 17th, when France went from rel-
atively light restrictions on daily life to complete lockdown, with
tens of thousands of police officers patrolling streets and issuing
fines of up to €135 to people who did not have a written declara-
tion to justify their reasons for being out of their homes [26] . 
In stark contradiction with the implementation of more severe
restrictions, the government decided to allow municipal elections
to proceed as scheduled starting on March 15th, with minimal
changes to voting procedures aside from priority lines for vulner-
able people and recommendations to maintain safe distances from
others [44] . This uneven policy approach also extended to border
control, with France initially issuing a loose recommendation to ar-
riving travellers to self-isolate for 14 days upon arrival, followed
by a complete closure of their borders to non-essential travellers
alongside the lockdown measures of March 17th, and may have
resulted in confusion amongst citizens about the severity of the
disease [26] . 
Government actions in Belgium followed a similar trajectory,
with increasingly more severe policies implemented as case num-
bers began to spike, culminating in a complete lockdown on March
17th prohibiting travel and forcing the closure of non-essential
businesses ( Fig. 10 ). These measures represented a notable depar-
ture from the announcements made by the central government
on March 12th, which explicitly stated that an “Italian-style” lock-
down was not part of the foreseen containment strategy. This
change in direction was partially caused by demands for stricter
measures from various regional authorities, which share publicealth competencies with the central government and thus have
ignificant influence within Belgium’s system of governance [45] . 
Belgium also experienced a higher burden of per capita cases
or its smaller population. This is partially explained by their more
xtensive testing and information management strategies, but it
as also likely influenced by the timing of their national school
olidays, which fell just as the outbreak was beginning to estab-
ish itself around Europe. Many of the early confirmed cases in the
ountry were traced to travellers who had returned from northern
taly, and the country’s case counts rose dramatically following the
nd of the holidays [27] . The same pattern with school holidays is
lso visible in the infection trends in Québec ( Fig. 11 ), with many
f their early cases being traced back to travellers who had visited
he United States [46] . 
These shared patterns did not extend to the governance and
he management of the crisis, however. While Belgium em-
loyed a shared competency approach between the central and
egional governments, in Canada the policy response was much
ore clearly delineated, with the federal government managing
conomic and border control policies while the provinces were
esponsible for most of the public health effort s. This led to
rovinces placing social restrictions along different timelines and
sing different measures, although their actions all generally fol-
owed the rising curve of new infections and grew more severe
s case numbers increased. Larger differences between provincial
ctions became apparent as governments moved to ease restric-
ions; B.C. was able to begin economic re-opening in mid-May due
o their relative success in containing the virus, while Ontario and
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Fig. 10. Timeline of economic and virus containment policies in Belgium contrasted with trends in daily new Covid-19 cases per 100 000 (Minimal, Medium, Severe, 
Uncategorized) [27] . 
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uébec struggled to implement decisive re-opening policies be-
ause they continued to battle regional outbreaks and new cases
n long-term care facilities well into June [35 , 36 , 37] . 
While the provinces worked to contain community transmis-
ion, the federal government implemented gradually more severe
order control measures, and the province of Québec unilater-
lly enforced inter-provincial border closures, eventually leading to
eavy restrictions on travellers from all countries and a manda-
ory 14-day quarantine for all arrivals. [47] . These measures ini-
ially exempted the United States, but this may have been a costly
ecision, as the majority of Canadian Covid-19 cases brought in by
ravellers originated in the U.S. On May 22nd, five days after the
orders were closed to other nationalities, the border with the U.S.
as closed amidst heavy political pressure due to surging Amer-
can case numbers and low public faith in American leadership
48] . 
he challenge of economic re -opening 
Although France, Belgium, and Canada had all reduced their
umbers of new cases by mid-June and were beginning to be-
in an easing of restrictions and a return to economic activity,
hey approached re-opening in a different way. The governments in
rance and Belgium had largely maintained mandatory mask poli-
ies for indoor public spaces and messaging campaigns to promote
hysical distancing but also quickly moved to allow the opening
f bars and restaurants and progressively larger social gatherings
26 , 27] . Even as case numbers began to rise again in late July, new
ontainment measures remained in the consideration stage only,
ith strong political hesitancy to cause any further economic dam-ge. One considered measure was the reinstating of border con-
rols in an attempt to slow down this growth in new cases, but
onsiderable questions remained about the danger that this resur-
ence would pose to health and the economy moving forwards
26 , 27] . 
The Canadian federal and provincial governments, on the other
and, proceeded much more cautiously with re-opening measures
y continuing strict mandatory quarantines for returning travel-
rs and border controls [30] . In tandem, the provinces continued
o enforce tight regulations on social gatherings with heavy fines
35 , 36 , 37] . The strictness of these ongoing restrictions compared
o the approach to re-opening in France and Belgium may be a
ritical reason why Canada did not see the same rise in cases as
he other two countries following a return to economic activity, al-
hough further research will be required once the full scope of this
second wave” of the pandemic can be understood [30] . It is also
ossible that Canada may still experience a similar rise in cases,
s their initial pandemic peak occurred later than those in Europe,
eaning that a possible second wave was merely delayed rather
han prevented. 
Despite the obvious differences in their policy actions, it can be
rgued that the resurgence in new cases was less of concern be-
ause these countries were now better equipped to manage a po-
ential second wave of the pandemic; France, Belgium and Canada
ll maintained their earlier increases to ICU capacity while also
ramatically increasing their testing rates ( Fig. 12 , next section).
ll three countries also experienced growing success with their at-
empts to expand contact tracing, with higher numbers of private
usinesses playing a role and more capacity being built into man-
al contact tracing systems [26 , 27 , 30] . 
440 Z. Desson, E. Weller and P. McMeekin et al. / Health Policy and Technology 9 (2020) 430–446 
Fig. 11. Timeline of economic and virus containment policies in Canada contrasted with trends in daily new Covid-19 cases per 100 000 (Minimal, Medium, Severe, Uncate- 
gorized) [30 , 35 , 36 , 37] . 
Fig. 12. Trends in the number of daily Covid-19 tests performed in France, Belgium, Ontario, Québec, B.C. and Canada (7 day rolling average) [26 , 27 , 30 , 35 , 36 , 37] . 
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w  esting and technology 
Several technological tools have been developed during the
OVID-19 pandemic ( Table 3 ) and much of the ability for gov-
rnments in France, Belgium and Canada to apply effective pol-
cy interventions relied upon effective testing strategies to provide
hem with accurate information [16] . These strategies also continue
o dictate policy-makers’ abilities to institute evidence-based ap-
roaches to easing restrictions and restarting economic activity, as
hey serve as the foundation for other technological approaches to
ngoing containment such as contact tracing. Both physical test-
ng capacities and data aggregation are essential components of an
fficient strategy, but each country had a different approach to re-
lizing these components. 
In Canada, the implementation of testing procedures varied sig-
ificantly between provinces, particularly at the outset of the pan-
emic. Initially, the national microbiology lab was the only entity
ith the capacity to test samples for Covid-19 and all of suspected
ases had to be sent there, greatly delaying any reliable informa-
ion about case numbers [30] . Most provinces quickly built their
wn testing abilities; Québec implemented aggressive testing early,
hile Ontario gradually broadened testing availability over time. 
In France, testing was conducted at a higher rate than shown
n Fig. 12 , but there was discord within the government regarding
he reporting of testing data, and testing was limited only to sus-
ected cases. Tests were being conducted by hospitals, laborato-
ies and even veterinary clinics across both the public and private
ectors, and the government struggled to aggregate the informa-
ion from all of these sources [49] . These difficulties led directly
o the launch of the secure SI-DEP platform on May 13th which
llowed all test providers to directly upload their results to a uni-
ed database. This system of sharing health data was supported
y special temporary legislation allowing its operation for up to
ix months after the state of emergency was declared to be over
26] . 
In Belgium, the government faced intense criticism over its
tringent testing policies early in the pandemic, but gradually in-
reased capacity throughout March and eventually reached the
ighest level of testing out of the three countries by early August
50] . Testing in Belgium was also given a substantial boost on April
1st, when the government expanded testing availability to anyone
ith flu-like symptoms, which dramatically increased the number
f tests being conducted across the country [27] . 
ealthcare system response 
As Covid-19 began to spread, policymakers found that their
exibility to respond was largely dictated by the capacity of their
ealthcare systems to manage a surge in cases. Beyond the im-
lementation of novel technologies and new testing strategies, the
ealthcare systems in France, Belgium and Canada were also forced
o adapt to the demands of the Covid-19 pandemic at a structural
evel ( Table 4 ). Repurposing of existing beds, equipment and labour
esources was necessary to support critical patients in some of the
ost affected areas, but through the process of making these ad-
ustments, some critical lessons were learned about the capacity of
hese healthcare systems moving forward. 
In the case of France, for example, the Ségur de la Santé work-
ng group was formed by government actors and stakeholders from
cross the country with the objective of applying the experiences
ained through the pandemic to a redesign of the French health-
are system [19] . In Canada, the most obvious vulnerability was
he long-term care sector, which in some cases required assistance
rom the military to manage virus outbreaks, leading to investiga-
ions exposing existing structural problems such as labour issues
ausing substandard levels of care [35] . It is too early to determinehether or not these lessons will have a lasting impact in the long
erm, but they do appear to have fostered a desire for changes to
ealthcare delivery in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
conomic overview 
In France, Belgium and Canada, health and social care are com-
onents of the national macroeconomy, with deep linkages be-
ween sectors due to the publicly-funded nature of their social
elfare systems. This interdependence across other national (and
nternational) economic components means that policy responses
o a pandemic must also be viewed within a broader context. The
ink between policies aimed at ameliorating the health impact of
ovid-19 and policies aimed at addressing the economic fallout of
he virus highlights the essential role of health (and social) care
ystems and health outcomes to the rest of the macroeconomy
 Table 5 ). 
Canada, France and Belgium have relatively similar gross do-
estic products (GDP) per capita, yet France is the most reliant on
ard hit sectors such as tourism and automotive industry. When
ncome inequality is considered, Canada has the greatest level of
nequality (GINI coefficient) which is confirmed by the high pro-
ortion of households earning less than half the median income
n the country [61] . Belgium has the highest GDP per capita using
urchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the lowest levels of inequality
nd households with low incomes. 
The IMF predicted that in 2020, Canada’s GDP will be least af-
ected by Covid-19 and France’s the most, suggesting that if the
conomic impacts follow the same socioeconomic trends as the
pread of the virus itself, inequalities in France are set to increase
he most [61] . Falling revenues from taxation and increased spend-
ng due to the pandemic will mean increasing deficits and each
ountry forecasts a significant increase in government debt [61] .
t remains too early to determine with certainty all of the long-
erm economic consequences of the pandemic, but the IMF projec-
ions appear to be accurate in the short term, as all three coun-
ries confirmed GDP losses for the first quarter of 2020 compared
o the previous quarter: 5.8% in France, 3.9% in Belgium, and 2.6%
n Canada [13] . 
Falling household expenditure and contracting GDP are likely
o further increase government debt as tax income falls, especially
ecause low consumer confidence about the future of the economy
s a feature of each country. McKinsey reported 90% of those sur-
eyed in Belgium and France were negative or unsure about the
uture prospects of the economy. The figure in Canada was 80%,
lthough this is set against a background of the highest household
ebt to GDP of the three countries [62] . There is little to suggest
hat in any country a consumer led recovery will reverse GDP de-
lines. Monetary policy in Europe has little to offer to policy mak-
rs, as the key interest rate was already at zero. Canada, where a
arge proportion of household debt is backed by real estate was
ble to make a monetary policy response by cutting the key inter-
st rate. However debt leveraged against real estate when prices
ove downwards due to macroeconomic factors is unlikely to in-
rease household confidence. 
conomic policy responses 
As France, Belgium and Canada implemented severe restrictions
n daily life in an effort to limit the spread of the virus, it became
lear that these restrictions would have a large negative impact
n their respective economies. Concerns about economic health
rove their governments to pass unprecedented financial support
ackages to support individuals and businesses. Economic concerns
ere also the main drivers behind reopening strategies as govern-
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Table 3 
Overview of technology implemented in response to Covid-19 in France, Belgium and Canada. 
Health Technology 
(Announcement or use of 
Health Technology) 
Contact Tracing France The Stop-Covid mobile app was released on June 1st after heated debates 
about data privacy. The app uses Bluetooth technology and its use is 
completely voluntary. Users will be warned if they have crossed paths with 
someone who has tested positive for Covid-19 in the two previous weeks. 
One week after its launch, 1.4 million people had downloaded it, 
representing only 2% of the population [51] . 
Belgium Belgium started its contact tracing trials on the 4th of May as part of their 
exit strategy, but refused to commit to an app-based approach until an 
announcement in early June that they would work to develop such an app 
by September. In the meantime, 2000 contact tracers were hired to perform 
manual contact tracing from call centers, which are operated by regional 
governments. The government in Brussels set aside €10m for contact tracing, 
with these measures expected to remain in place for one full year [52] . 
Canada In an effort to implement nationwide contact tracing, the federal 
government created the Canadian Digital Service, which developed an app 
based on Bluetooth technology provided by Apple and Google. The 
government has emphasized that the app is voluntary but recommended as 
many people download it to improve effectiveness. The app was first piloted 
in Ontario on July 2 before being released nationwide. Complicating matters, 
some provinces had already launched their own apps, such as ABTrace in 
Alberta, which was activated on May 1st. This created concern for a 
fragmentation of contact tracing networks across the country that could 
damage their effectiveness [53] . 
Healthcare Delivery and 
Prevention of Covid-19 infections 
France Healthcare delivery : Some existing 3D printers were re-purposed to create 
masks and non-invasive ventilators [54] . 
Healthcare delivery : The government relaxed the conditions for carrying out 
telemedicine acts until April 30th. Doctolib, the largest provider of 
telemedicine services, delivered over 100 000 teleconsultations per day 
while confinement measures were active, 100 times more than before the 
pandemic [26] . 
Prevention : The Pasteur Institute has set up a “covid-score” website where 
individuals can calculate their risk of getting severe complications or dying 
from Covid-19, based on statistics around risk factors such as age, size, 
weight, and sex. This website was launched on the 11th of May to support 
phase one of deconfinement [55] . 
Healthcare delivery : The telepresence robot “Pepper” was used in a Paris ICU 
in an attempt to keep patients connected to their social networks and 
prevent mental health issues [56] . 
Belgium Healthcare delivery : On April 1st, Belgium started reimbursement for 
teleconsultations related to COVID-19. Under this measure, physicians were 
allowed to give out medical advice over the phone to help patients who 
were potentially infected with Covid-19 and to ensure continuity of care for 
patients with chronic diseases who faced increased risks in leaving their 
homes [20] . 
Canada Prevention: The federal government released the “Canada COVID-19 App and 
Daily Symptom Tracker” alongside an online self-assessment tool in an 
attempt to provide official information to citizens regarding pandemic policy 
measures and healthcare options. 
Prevention: The ArriveCAN app was developed to pre-screen arriving 
travellers and create a more contactless border security process [30] . 
Healthcare Delivery: Prior to the pandemic, telemedicine represented just 
0.15% of all medical services delivered in Canada, due to billing models that 
paid more for physical visits. B.C. responded by making digital health 
services billable at the same rate as physical appointments, but in other 
provinces there has been little support for a shift to telemedicine [35–37] . 
Covid-19 Treatment France The state recommended to suspected Covid-19 patients to use video-call 
consultations to get diagnosed and monitored at home in order to avoid 
risks of transmission and burdening of healthcare service. Patients with 
other pathologies were also encouraged to get treated remotely [26] . 
Remote monitoring also involved patients with confirmed or suspected 
Covid-19 receiving a secure link to a self-assessment questionnaire every day 
through the Covidom app, with follow-up calls from physicians if their state 
of health worsened [57] . 
Belgium A consortium of 7 Belgian medtech companies developed the “Covid-19 
smart patch” to remotely monitor respiration, heart rate, and temperature of 
Covid-19 patients [58] . 
Canada Health Canada approved over 43 clinical trials for Covid-19 treatments (as of 
10/06), including multiple for the controversial drug hydroxychloroquine. 
Novel chest x-ray technology that bypasses radiologist assessment 
requirements was also sped through the approval process for new medical 
devices in the hopes of obtaining faster Covid-19 diagnoses. 
A “DNA testing cube” the size of a coffee cup was developed by Canadian 
startups and can process Covid-19 tests in under an hour, and the federal 
government agreed to a procurement contract of 14000 per month [30] . 
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Table 4 
Adaptations to the healthcare systems in France, Belgium and Canada caused by the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. 
Sector France Belgium Canada 
Healthcare workforce Under the ORSAN emergency plan, the 
government mobilized the health 
workforce through four main methods: 
reorganisation of working staff, increased 
volunteer capacity, the ‘health reserve’ of 
retired and student health professionals 
that could be mobilized as required, and 
the requisition of new staff wherever 
possible [19] . 
The Health Minister signed a royal decree 
on May 4th to temporarily allow some 
non-nurse workers to take on duties 
normally done by qualified nurses. The 
decree was labelled a “declaration of war”
by healthcare professionals, leading to 
inconsistent application [20] . 
Provinces generally applied the same types of 
strategies to optimize their health workforces. 
In Ontario, Québec and B.C., nurses and 
specialists were redeployed from surgical 
units into medical ones as required once 
elective surgeries were put on hold, based 
largely on regional needs [35 , 36 , 37] . 
Ontario also restructured some nursing 
positions in order to add 1300 phone lines to 
the provincial telehealth hotline [35] . 
Acute (Hospital) Care The ORSAN plan also called for 
re-organization of hospital care. The plan 
specifically states that hospitalization 
must occur only for emergency situations, 
and requires all establishments, including 
private ones, to postpone certain 
non-essential interventions, “open”
additional beds and reinforce their 
workforce [26] . 
Despite the increased capacity under 
ORSAN, the military was deployed to 
assist the healthcare system by moving 
patients from high-demand hospitals to 
ones with more available capacity, 
including some in Switzerland and 
Germany [26] . 
Starting on March 14th, emergency 
departments were divided in two to 
accommodate Covid-19 patients and 
non-Covid-19 patients, requiring 
additional infrastructure, labour and 
equipment [20] . 
On March 22nd, the health minister 
announced that 759 new ICU beds would 
be added as part of the national 
emergency plan [20] . 
On March 30th, a plan was designed to 
redistribute patients across hospitals in 
the most affected regions to reduce stress 
on the highest-demand facilities [59] . 
Ontario was able to increase ICU capacity by 
~90% throughout the month of April by 
repurposing beds, and B.C. was also able to 
boost their ICU capacity using the same 
methods. Québec did not have the same 
flexibility in resources and struggled to 
improve their capacity. However, all provinces 
enacted some level of hiatus on elective 
procedures to further relieve stress on their 
healthcare systems. [35 , 36 , 37] . 
Data on system use by non-Covid patients is 
not often publically available, but a large drop 
in average hospital wait times during the 
pandemic may indicate that people were not 
seeking care as they normally would [35] . 
Mental Health On March 22nd, Santé Publique France 
launched a population wide survey called 
“CoviPrev” to monitor the behaviours and 
mental health of French citizens during 
the pandemic. Despite generally reduced 
access to mental health care during the 
crisis, early data from the survey suggests 
that there are no significant changes to 
the prevalence of mental health issues 
[26] . 
Prior to the pandemic, Belgium completed 
a major shift in mental health care 
systems away from hospitals and towards 
better-equipped community-based care. 
Despite this, Sciensano conducted a 
survey of 44 000 respondents and found 
that depressive disorders increased from 
10% in 2018 to a rate of 16% (as of May 
5th). The prevalence of depression also 
tripled in young women (30%) and 
quadrupled in young men (29%) [27] . 
To address concerns about the effect of social 
restrictions on mental health, the government 
of Canada launched the “Wellness Together 
Canada” online portal. This provided digital 
access to numerous mental healthcare options 
either through hotlines or text messages, and 
available mental health practitioners were 
incentivized to participate [30] . B.C. and 
Québec implemented similar solutions, 
including a Covid-19 psychological hotline 
and specific supports for healthcare workers 
[36 , 37] . 
Finance The government passed an “exceptional”
health spending policy of €7b, notably to 
finance €4b in new equipment and to 
supplement the salaries of healthcare 
workers. As part of this package, the 
government agreed to cover 50% of the 
costs of any personal protective 
equipment (PPE) purchased by regional 
authorities starting on April 28th, to 
support safe deconfinement [26] . 
Moving forward, the government has also 
started a process of rethinking the 
healthcare system under the “Ségur de la 
Santé” commission. As of June 10th, this 
includes €12b in increased funding for 
public hospitals [19] . 
Belgium implemented a raft of policies to 
financially support the healthcare sector. 
Lump sum payments were directed to 
hospitals, user fees were removed from 
alll telehealth and digital health services, 
and free access to care was temporarily 
extended to undocumented migrants. 
Citizens who were self-employed were 
allowed to request a deferral of health 
insurance contributions [20] . 
Taxation was also leveraged as a conduit 
for aid, with the government removing 
taxes from any donations of medical 
equipment. [6] 
The government of Canada made health 
research funding a priority during the 
pandemic, approving 99 research grants 
totalling $275 m to develop medical 
countermeasures against Covid-19 and future 
pandemics [30] . 
Increases to funding for health care systems 
primarily came from the provincial level. 
Ontario created a dedicated CAD $1b Covid-19 
contingency fund for additional health care 
investments, alongside a contingency fund of 
CAD $1.3 billion to provide flexibility to 
changing global circumstances moving 
forward. [35] 
Meanwhile, Québec funnelled an additional 
CAD $133 m into their embattled long-term 
care facilities. [36] 
Long-term care Residents in long-term care facilities 
(EHPAD) accounted for over 50% of all 
Covid-19 deaths in France, despite a ban 
on visitors and mandatory PPE 
requirements being put in place. This led 
the government to retain many of the 
restrictive measures within EHPAD 
facilities even after the rest of society 
entered the first phases of deconfinement. 
Family visits of up to 2 people with 
masks were allowed again on May 11th, 
but many activities for residents remained 
limited and admissions of new residents 
were greatly delayed, leading to increased 
home care burdens [19] . 
Residents in long-term care facilities 
accounted for over 30% of Covid-19 
deaths in Belgium. All visitors were 
banned on March 12th, but no distancing 
measures were put in place within the 
homes themselves, and there were 
multiple reports of intra-resident 
transmissions leading to deaths. 
Government PPE procurement also gave 
priority to hospitals, leaving staff at 
long-term care facilities with a lack of 
appropriate PPE [60] . 
As of May 25th, residents of long-term care 
facilities accounted for 81% of Canadian 
Covid-19 deaths. Québec and Ontario both 
requested and received military assistance in 
some of their most affected long-term care 
facilities [35 , 36] . The federal government 
made this assistance conditional on a full 
investigation by military personnel of the 
conditions in these facilities. The resulting 
reports noted aggressive treatment toward 
residents, cases of residents being improperly 
fed with poor hygienic care, and inadequate 
supplies of PPE [3] . These reports led to the 
creation of several government task forces to 
improve long-term care moving forward 
[35 , 36] . 
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Table 5 
Various pre and post-Covid-19 economic indicators in France, Belgium and Canada. 
France Belgium Canada 
GINI Coefficient. OECD [13] 0.292 0.263 0.310 
Proportion of households incomes below 50% of median 
household income. OECD [13] 
0.253 0.217 0.305 
IMF estimated contraction in GDP due to Covid-19 [61] 7.2% 6.9% 6.2% 
Pre Covid-19 Govt. debt to GDP ratio 98.1% [26] 99.2% [63] 31% [3] 
Post Covid-19 Govt. estimated debt to GDP ratio 115% [26] 115% [63] 48% [3] 
Household Debt as percentage of GDP IMF 2018 60.00% 61.29% 100.68% 
Consumer Confidence, pessimistic or unsure of long term 
consequences of COVID on economy McKinsey May 2020 [62] 
89% 90% 80% 
Interest rates before and after Covid-19 0%, 0% 0%, 0% 1.75%, 0.25% 
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b  ments faced increasing pressure to ease restrictions regardless of
the epidemiological state of affairs. 
In mid-March, France amended the national budget to include
an initial €45b in support packages, which was increased to €110b
(5% of GDP) in April. Some of the major features from these pack-
ages included supplementing health and credit insurance schemes,
increased spending on health supplies, and tax leniency for both
individuals and large organizations [61] . To reduce friction in the
labour market upon a return to normal activities, a large amount
of this funding also went to wage subsidies so that employees
could be retained on company payrolls. Many of these measures
were scheduled to be phased out starting in June, which prove to
be premature as there is not enough available data related to the
economic impact of the pandemic restrictions and a reliable cost-
benefit analysis cannot yet be performed [61] . 
Despite the planned phase-out of financial aid, some sectors
that were deemed critical to the economy such as the automotive
industry are scheduled to receive specific assistance tied to spe-
cial incentives. With this financial support, the French government
mandated that certain conditions related to environmental stan-
dards be met, including the increased production of “greener” ve-
hicles [61] . The impacts of this type of conditional aid program,
which is also being applied to the German automotive industry,
merits further research as the French economy begins to recover. 
Similar to the situation in France, Belgium implemented a pack-
age of fiscal measures to help manage the crisis in their €10.2b
(2.3% of GDP) “Stability Program”, which included many of the
same key elements. Though the amount of direct government sup-
port is comparably smaller, Belgium also introduced a €51.9b loan
guarantee scheme to help anchor their financial aid strategy, which
was intended to help any business or household that was nega-
tively affected by the pandemic [61] . Both Belgium and France both
also agreed to provide targeted support to their tourism sectors,
which are expected to continue to suffer Covid-19 related losses
until at least the end of 2020. 
As was the case with other policy actions taken in Canada, the
federal government took certain steps to implement national-level
economic policies, while the provinces were more varied in their
responses. The main thrust of the federal government’s aid pack-
age was CAD $116b (5.5% of GDP) in direct aid to households and
firms, including wage subsidies and increasing tax credits [61] . The
most salient part of this package was the Canadian Emergency Re-
sponse Benefit (CERB), which was a monthly CAD $20 0 0 direct
cash payment to individuals who were unable to work due to the
pandemic. In a different approach than that taken by France, the
Canadian government opted to extend the CERB for 4 months past
its originally planned June phase-out date in an effort to support a
faster economic recovery [30] . 
Although the federal government has a much larger share of
governance competency related to economic matters, individual
provinces also announced relief measures within their respective
scope. Québec made a concerted effort to support cultural insti-
tutions through a CAD $46 m investment in the Arts Council of a  uébec and a CAD $10 m infusion to the circus industry and Cirque
u Soleil, while Ontario and B.C. both announced broad packages
ith funding for their agri-food, electricity, fishing, forestry, and
ourism sectors [64] . 
conomic impact analysis 
Much more data needs to be observed and collected regarding
he overall health and economic impacts of pandemic policy ac-
ions in these countries, notably with regards to mental health and
ong-term economic outcomes, but using the early economic data
resented in this section it is possible to conduct a rudimentary
conomic analysis to estimate the potential costs associated with
he protection of public health. Each country’s reported quarter-
ver-quarter GDP losses from Q1 can be used as a crude proxy for
he economic costs associated with containment measures. Mod-
lling has also been conducted to estimate the number of lives
aved by these containment measures, with one study including
rance and Belgium (up to May 4th) [65] and another containing
 projection for Canada (for all of 2020) [66] .By combining these
wo measurements, a basic cost per life saved figure can be calcu-
ated for each country: 
• France - €191 657.68 
• Belgium - €261 527.12 
• Canada - €116 927.91 
It should be noted that the numbers are highly speculative, as
DP cannot be taken as a perfect proxy for costs of lockdown,
nd estimates of lives saved were derived from imperfect statis-
ical models and would be far more informative if life years were
pecified instead given the skewed distribution of mortality across
ge groups. Nonetheless, these figures show that Belgium paid a
uch higher economic price as a result of its pandemic contain-
ent measures, which is likely due in part to its less effective ini-
ial response and ensuing higher mortality rates. Future research
ffort s in this area should continue to focus on thorough data col-
ection and sound methodological choices in order to deliver more
ccurate estimates that will be relevant to policy makers as the
ovid-19 situation continues to evolve. 
onclusions and policy implications 
Our analyses have highlighted key similarities and differences
etween the policy responses between France, Belgium and Canada
uring the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. While the differ-
nce between federal and centralized states is clear, further distin-
uishing between the Canadian and Belgian systems required fur-
her consideration of geographic size and population density. Over-
ll, Belgium was the most affected by Covid-19, and policies there
ay have been less effective than in France of Canada. One possi-
le explanation may be the shared responsibility between national
nd regional governments may have slowed down decision-making
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rocesses, or even caused policy choices that reflected compro-
ises between stakeholders and thus were not optimally effec-
ive. By contrast, the largely provincial decision-making in Canada
as allowed certain provinces such as British Columbia to harness
trong governance capacity to swiftly tackle the pandemic, while
thers like Quebec have struggled to flatten the curve, perhaps due
n part to a more laissez-faire approach to policy-making. 
In France, more centralized decision-making may have allowed
or more effective coordination of healthcare resources across
he country, which was aided by a more transparent and inte-
rated data policy, again facilitated by a strong central government.
his provides another contrast with Canada, where decentralized
ecision-making prevented widespread resource sharing between
eighbouring provinces even if some had available hospital capac-
ty, a situation that was further exacerbated by time lags in bring-
ng the information on COVID cases back to the federal level. It
hould be noted that these coordination issues existed despite con-
entrated effort s f or improvement being made in response to the
arlier SARS pandemic. 
While the greater centralization in France may have helped
ith resource coordination, it was not enough to catalyse the im-
lementation of an effective testing strategy. Compared to its more
ederalist comparators, France’s testing policies were delayed and
oft-handed and may have hindered its overall ability to manage
he pandemic. In Canada, on the other hand, being in a decentral-
zed setting allowed some provinces to quickly build their testing
apacities, even though this was primarily done to address a lack
f infrastructure at a national level and may have contributed to
he unequal epidemiological success across provinces. 
Despite issues with testing, centralization appears to have been
ore effective at reacting to the early lessons learned from the
ovid-19 crisis. The most emblematic example of this reactive ca-
acity is the Ségur de la Santé: the heavy stress put on hospital
apacity in France triggered a new plan to invest €12 billions in
he public hospital system, including a reevaluation of healthcare
orker salaries, following a consultative process that was expected
o be completed during the summer of 2020. There is no compa-
able effort to address wider health system issues in Belgium or
anada. In fact, there is yet no clear strategic direction on the next
tage in Belgium, which speaks to the difficulty of joint decision-
aking in a decentralized governance system. 
Although a governance perspective provides many insights into
he policy-making environments in these three countries during
he Covid-19 pandemic, it also comes with obvious limitations.
or example, the long term care sector has been severely affected
oth in France and in Canada, and the disproportionally heavier
oll taken on this sector in Canada may be more linked to trends
owards privatization rather than the degree of governance de-
entralization. Similarly, the impotance of national and regional
ulture as it relates to decision-making in healthcare could also
lay a role in the way Covid-19 policies were implemented and
heir eventual effectiveness. Further research is still needed to fur-
her understand the various impacts and responses to COVID in
ountries with varying degrees of centralization, including research
nalysing different countries, in order to uncover the impact of
overnance systems within the wider societal context of a pan-
emic. 
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